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The Bush administration advocates its January 2003 proposal to repeal personal dividend 
taxation on the basis that the cut would stimulate the economy, primarily benefit 
American seniors, and eliminate an unfair case of “double taxation.”  This paper 
primarily analyzes the proposal using a different criterion – its distributional impacts.  
Contrary to the administration’s claim that seniors receive over half of all dividend 
income, U.S. Census Bureau data indicate that seniors receive only about one-quarter of 
dividend income.  Dividend income is more concentrated towards high-income tax filers 
than the distribution of U.S. income as a whole.  About two-thirds of dividend income 
accrues to the top 10% of tax filers.  Less than one-fifth of tax filers with adjusted gross 
incomes of less than $75,000 have any dividend income at all.  Also, dividend income is 
highly skewed by race – only 8% of blacks and 6% of Hispanics receive dividend 
income.   
 
An analysis of the distribution of the benefits of repealing dividend taxes is conducted 
using IRS summary data of the 2000 tax returns.  Most taxpayers (about three-quarters) 
receive no dividend income and would receive no direct benefits from the proposal to 
repeal dividend taxes.  On the other hand, filers with an adjusted gross income of at least 
$100,000 would receive average annual benefits of over $3,000.  Over 75% of the total 
benefits would accrue to the top 8% of taxpayers.  About 40% of the benefits would 
accrue to the top ½% of taxpayers, who would receive average annual tax savings of 
about $26,000. 
 
The distribution of benefits is more skewed than the distribution of dividend income.  
From this fact we can conclude that the proposal to repeal dividend taxation would, 
ceteris paribus, increase after-tax income inequality in the U.S.  Given that U.S. 
inequality is higher than in any other developed country and at an historic high, policies 
that reduce inequality seem more desirable than those that have the opposite effect.  
Given the significant cost of the overall tax cut, one likely long-term effect is the 
reduction of federal services including, perhaps, Social Security benefits.  Thus, the 
ironic conclusion is that the President’s proposal, rather than helping low-income seniors, 
appears more likely to hurt them because of the potential for shortfalls in Social Security 
funding in the long term. G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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In January of 2003 President Bush outlined a proposal for a new round of tax cuts 
intended to boost the American economy.  A key component of this proposal is the repeal 
of dividend taxation for individual taxpayers.  In his January 28, 2003 State of the Union 
speech, Bush stated that: 
 
“We should also strengthen the economy by treating investors equally in our tax 
laws.  It's fair to tax a company's profits. It is not fair to again tax the shareholder 
on the same profits. To boost investor confidence, and to help the nearly 10 




The implication that dividend taxation particularly harms low-income seniors is repeated 
in further official presentation of the President’s plan: 
 
“Roughly 35 million American households receive dividend income that is 
taxable and will directly benefit under the President's plan. More than half of 
these dividends go to America's seniors, many of whom rely on these checks for a 
steady source of income in their retirement.” 
 
“Almost half of all savings from the dividend exclusion under the President's plan 
would go to taxpayers 65 and older. The average tax savings for the 9.8 million 
seniors receiving dividends would be $936.”
2 
 
From these statements, we see that the President offers three points in promoting his 
proposal.  First, repealing shareholder dividend taxation will boost investor confidence 
and provide a stimulus to the economy.  Second, the current scheme of taxing dividends 
at both the corporate and shareholder level is unfair.  Third, the tax cut will particularly 
benefit seniors. 
 
This paper will primarily analyze the distributional implications of the President’s 
proposal to repeal dividend taxes, including the impact on seniors.  However, before 
proceeding to the analysis some brief comments are offered on the first two supporting 
reasons presented by the Bush administration for the tax plan.   
 
The stimulus effect of the President’s proposal has its supporters and detractors, among 
both politicians and economists.  A group of over 450 economists, including 10 Nobel 
                                                 
1 Excerpt taken from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-17.html.  Accessed 
Feb. 20, 2003. 
2 Excerpts taken from http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/economy/.  Accessed Feb. 5, 2003.  G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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laureates, recently signed a statement in opposition to the overall tax plan.  Regarding the 
proposal to repeal dividend taxation, the statement reads: 
 
“The permanent dividend tax cut, in particular, is not credible as a short-term 
stimulus.  As tax reform, the dividend tax cut is misdirected in that it targets 
individuals rather than corporations, is overly complex, and could be, but is not, 
part of a revenue-neutral tax reform effort.”
3 
 
In opposition, a statement signed by over 100 economists, including three Nobel 
laureates, expressed support for the Bush administration’s overall proposal, including 
repealing dividend taxation.
4  On February 11, 2003, Federal Reserve chairman Alan 
Greenspan questioned the need for the fiscal stimulus embodied in the tax cut proposal.  
While Greenspan expressed support for the basic concept of eliminating dividend 




The President’s second point, that dividend taxation is unfair, must be evaluated in the 
context of the broader tax code.  “Double taxation” is not unique to the situation of 
dividends.  In fact, double taxation is both widespread and commonly accepted.  For 
example, state sales taxes represent a form of double taxation – income is taxed by states 
both when it is received and when it is spent.  Excise taxes on goods such as gasoline, 
cigarettes, and alcohol can also be viewed as a double taxation.  Other factors are more 
important than how often a transaction or income is taxed, including the overall tax rate, 
the distribution of taxes, and the effect of taxation on market outcomes.  So the 
President’s inference that double taxation is, in principle, unfair does not appear justified. 
 
The economists publicly opposing the Bush tax cuts have criticized the President’s 
proposal in that it will “generate further inequalities in after-tax income.”
6  Franco 
Modigliani, who received the 1985 Nobel in economics, called the proposal to repeal 
dividend taxes “a preposterous program.  It has only one effect: to make the very rich” 
richer.  While the 2000 Nobel winner Daniel McFadden called it a “weapon of mass 
destruction aimed at the middle class.”
7  This paper specifically analyzes the 
distributional implications of the proposal to repeal dividend taxation.  Three important 
conclusions are reached: 
 
1.  The President’s claim that more than half of dividends go to seniors is not 
supported by the data.  Instead, the majority of dividends go to high-income 
households, particularly those that are middle-aged and white. 
                                                 
3 The full statement is available at http://www.epinet.org/stmt/2003/statement_signed.pdf (Accessed Feb. 
20, 2003).  The statement also appeared in a full-page ad in the New York Times on Feb. 11, 2003. 
4 The full statement, as sent the U.S. Congress by the National Taxpayers Union, is available at 
http://www.ntu.org/features/ntu_on_capitolhill/L0301taxpayeragenda.php3 (Accessed Feb. 20, 2003). 
5 “Greenspan Throws Cold Water On Bush Arguments for Tax Cut,” New York Times, Feb. 12, 2003, Sec. 
A, Page 1. 
6 From the Economists’ Statement Opposing the Bush Tax Cuts, available at 
http://www.epinet.org/stmt/2003/statement_signed.pdf (Accessed Feb. 20, 2003).   
7 “Nobel Laureates Attack Tax Plan,” Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 2003, Page D1. G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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2.  Repeal of dividend taxation would be a highly-skewed benefit in favor of high-
income households.  Based on an analysis of IRS tax returns, about 75% of the 
tax savings would accrue to those with an adjusted gross income of $100,000 or 
more – less than 10% of all tax filers.  Most tax filers receive no dividend income 
and would, consequently, receive no direct benefits from the elimination of 
dividend taxes. 
3.  The proposal to repeal dividend taxation will, ceteris paribus, exacerbate income 
inequality in the U.S.  Given that current levels of income inequality in the U.S. 
are at historic high levels, and higher than in any other developed country, one 
must question the pursuit of policies that further increase inequality. 
 
 
II. Dividend Income and Seniors 
 
First, we explore the validity of the President’s claim that more than half of dividends go 
to seniors.  The U.S. Census Bureau publishes data annually on the distribution and 
composition of money income in the United States.  For this analysis, the most recent 
complete data on dividend income is used, based on 1999 data.
8  The Census Bureau data 
indicate that in 1999 about 40 million people received dividend income.  Among these 
individuals, the average dividend income was $3,112.  The Census Bureau divides its 
income data into four age categories.  Table 1 presents the 1999 distribution of dividend 
income by these four categories.  In sharp contrast to the President’s claim, only about 
26% of all dividend income is received by those age 65 or over.  In fact, people aged 25-
44 received more dividend income in 1999 than people age 65 or over.  The age group 
with the largest proportion of dividend income includes those aged 45 to 64 years.  No 
evidence could be located in support of the assertion that seniors receive more than half 
of all dividend income. 
 
 















Share of Dividend 
Income (percent) 
15-24 Years  1,841  $1,501  $2.763  2.2% 
25-44 Years  15,669  $2,331  $36.524  28.9% 
45-64 Years  16,039  $3,397  $54.484  43.2% 
65 or Over  7,014  $4,627  $32.454  25.7% 
TOTAL  40,564  $3,112  $126.225
9  100.0% 
   
 
 
                                                 
8 Money Income in the United States, 1999, U.S. Census Bureau report P60-209, September 2000. 
9 Note that the total dividend income obtained from summing the dividend income for each age category 
differs slightly from the total obtained by multiplying 40,564,000 people by the $3,112 average dividend 
income.  The difference is likely due to rounding errors or minor discrepancies in the data. G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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III. The Distribution of Dividend Income   
 
The most relevant issue in studying the distributional impacts of repealing dividend 
taxation is the distribution by income.  To explore how dividends are spread across the 
income spectrum, we use summary data from the 2000 individual income tax returns filed 
with the Internal Revenue Service.
10  The IRS data indicate the total number of returns 
with dividend income (about 34 million) and the total amount of dividend income 
claimed by taxpayers (about $147 billion).  These data are given for each of 19 adjusted 
gross income (AGI) categories.  AGI includes income from wages, interest, dividends, 
capital gains, business profits, rents, alimony, and several other sources, less allowable 
deductions from IRA contributions, moving expenses, self-employed health insurance, 
and other deductions. 
 
The detailed AGI categories given by the IRS allow a comprehensive analysis of the 
distribution of dividend income, particularly among those with very high incomes.  Table 
2 presents the distribution of dividend income by AGI.  About 85% of all tax filers have 
an AGI of under $75,000, but fewer than one-fifth of these filers have any dividend 
income at all.  Tax filers with an AGI of $75,000 or less received an average dividend 
income in 2000 of about $380.  Contrast this with the claim that seniors will receive an 
average tax savings of $936.  In reality, the majority of Americans will receive no benefit 
from the proposal to repeal dividend taxes simply because they have no dividend income.   
 
Unlike the typical American, we can see in Table 2 that those in the upper income 
brackets receive a significant amount of dividend income.  Tax filers with an AGI of 
$100,000 or more, about 8% of all filers, received 63% of all dividend income in 2000, 
with average dividends of about $8,500.  For those tax filers with an AGI of $500,000 or 
more, nearly all received at least some dividend income.  Those with an AGI of more 
than $10 million received average dividends of nearly $1 million in 2000.  Clearly, these 
are the taxpayers who stand to benefit substantially from a repeal of dividend taxation. 
 
 
                                                 
10 “Individual Income Tax Returns, 2000” by David Campbell and Michael Parisi, IRS Statistics of Income 
Bulletin, Fall 2002. 
Box 1: The Racial Distribution of Dividend Income  
 
The distribution of dividend income is skewed on the basis of race.  According 
to the U.S. Census Bureau, whites received 93% of all dividend income in 1999 
while only 75% of the U.S. population is white.  About 23% of all whites with 
any income had some dividend income in 1999.  Non-whites are much less 
likely to have dividend income.  Only 8% of blacks and 6% of Hispanics with 
income in 1999 had dividend income.  Whites with dividend income also tend to 
receive more dividend income than non-whites with dividend income.  While 
whites with dividend income received an average of $3,161 in dividends in 
1999, blacks received $2,377 and Hispanics received $2,695.     G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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11  1,146  382  $1,576  $1,375 
$1 under $5,000  12,803  2,024  1,126  88 
$5,000 under $10,000  12,802  1,605  1,904  149 
$10,000 under $15,000  12,111  1,623  2,667  220 
$15,000 under $20,000  11,662  1,588  3,193  274 
$20,000 under $25,000  9,993  1,417  2,492  249 
$25,000 under $30,000  8,369  1,355  2,618  313 
$30,000 under $40,000  13,547  2,927  5,391  398 
$40,000 under $50,000  10,412  2,712  6,288  604 
$50,000 under $75,000  17,076  6,303  14,572  853 
$75,000 under $100,000  8,597  4,340  12,569  1,462 
$100,000 under $200,000  8,083  5,430  26,866  3,324 
$200,000 under $500,000  2,136  1,836  23,168  10,848 
$500,000 under $1,000,000  396  368  11,465  28,943 
$1,000,000 under $1,500,000  100  95  5,163  51,882 
$1,500,000 under $2,000,000  45  43  3,489  78,266 
$2,000,000 under $5,000,000  67  65  8,072  120,901 
$5,000,000 under $10,000,000  18  17  4,694  266,578 
$10,000,000 or more  11  11  9,673  862,542 
TOTAL  129,374  34,141  $146,986  $1,136 
 
 
To further explore the distribution of dividend income, we can plot the cumulative 
proportion of tax returns, arranged from lowest to highest, against the cumulative 
proportion of dividend income.  This plot is similar to a Lorenz curve, commonly used to 
illustrate inequality in the income distribution.
12  As seen in Figure 1, the plot displays a 
high degree of curvature, indicating a significant level of inequality.  The bottom half of 
taxpayers received only about 10% of all dividend income.  About 65% of all dividend 
income accrued to the highest 10% of taxpayers while the top ½% of taxpayers received 
about 30% of dividend income. 
 
Similar to analyses of income distribution, one can calculate a Gini coefficient based on 
the distribution of dividend income (see Appendix 1 for the details of calculating a Gini 
coefficient).  Approximate calculations indicate that the Gini coefficient for dividend  
                                                 
11 Includes individuals with zero or negative AGI.  For example, a sole proprietor claiming a net loss could 
have a negative AGI yet still claim positive dividend income. 
12 Note that this plot is not exactly analogous to a Lorenz curve.  A Lorenz curve plots the distribution of 
income ordered by income.  Figure 1 plots dividend income ordered by AGI, not ordered by dividend 
income.  G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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income, based on the distribution by AGI, is about 0.70.
13  This is much more unequal 
than the distribution of U.S. income as a whole, which is currently about 0.47. 
 
 
IV. Benefits to Seniors from Repeal of Dividend Taxation 
 
The President claims that seniors, nearly 10 million strong, would receive a 
disproportionate share of the benefits from eliminating dividend taxes – an average 
savings of nearly $1,000 each.  We now examine these assertions.  First, do 9.8 million 
seniors currently receive dividend income?  The Census Bureau data presented in Table 1 
indicate that the number of people aged 65 and over who received dividend income in 
1999 was only about seven million – 17% lower than the administration’s figure.  A 
couple of explanations could be suggested to explain the discrepancy.  The administration 
could be using more recent data showing that more seniors receive dividend income.  
Also, the administration could be using a different definition of “seniors,” such as those 
aged 60 or over. 
 
Next, consider the administration’s claim that seniors with dividend income will receive 
an average benefit of $936.  An important point is the difference between the average 
benefit and the benefits to the typical senior with dividend income.  Given an unequal 
                                                 
13 Gini coefficient calculation made by assuming linearity between each data point.  This creates a minor 
downward bias in the calculation; the actual Gini coefficient based on dividend income would be slightly 
higher.  G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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distribution of dividend income among seniors, most seniors with dividend income would 
realize benefits less than $936 while a relatively small number would obtain benefits 
much larger than $936.  The administration also fails to mention that only about 22% of 
all seniors have any dividend income at all.  So over three-quarters of seniors would 
receive no benefit whatsoever from the elimination of dividend taxation. 
 
Is the President’s average tax savings estimate of $936 valid?  The detailed data 
necessary to explore the validity of this claim are not readily available.
14  However, a 
speculative analysis can be conducted which, incidentally, sheds some additional light on 
what type of seniors receive dividend income.  We know from Table 1 that the average 
dividend income for a senior who received dividend income in 1999 was $4,627.  A tax 
savings of $936 would imply that the average marginal tax rate for dividend income 
received by seniors would have to be 20.2%.  In order for a senior to reach a tax bracket 
above 15% (the next highest rate is 27%), he or she would have to have taxable income
15 
in 2002 of $27,950 if filing as single, and $46,700 if filing a joint return.  However, most 
seniors do not have sufficient income to enter the 27% tax bracket.  According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau, mean total income for seniors in 1999 was only $21,417.
16  With 
deductions and exemptions, average taxable income for seniors would be in the range of 
$12,000 assuming a single filer with the standard deduction and exemption (less for a tax 
status of married filing jointly).  So, most seniors would be taxed at a maximum marginal 
rate of 10% or 15%, inconsistent with the implied tax rate based on the administration’s 
average benefits of $936. 
 
We cannot conclude that the administration’s estimate of average tax savings is inflated.  
The likely explanation is that seniors who receive dividend income have higher incomes 
than most seniors and are taxed at a higher marginal rate.  Of course, the problem with 
this explanation is that it undermines the administration’s implication that needy seniors 
rely on dividend income to get by.  The analysis above suggests that most of these are not 
low-income seniors struggling to make ends meet but reasonably secure seniors who are 
not in desperate need of tax relief. 
 
 
V. Who Really Benefits from Repealing Dividend Taxation 
 
As one might expect from the data presented earlier, the major beneficiaries of the 
dividend tax repeal would be the very wealthy, not seniors.  An important point to 
consider is that lower-income Americans who receive dividend income are taxed at lower 
marginal rates.  Many Americans are taxed at a maximum marginal rate of only 10% or 
15%, and few are taxed at a rate above 27% (a married couple would need taxable 
income of about $113,000 to exceed the 27% tax bracket).  However, high-income 
taxpayers are taxed at a higher marginal rate, up to 38.6% in 2002.  So, typical taxpayers 
receive little, if any, dividend income and would receive savings of 10%, 15%, or at most 
                                                 
14 Specifically, one would need to know the distribution of seniors’ income, including dividends, by AGI. 
15 Note that taxable income differs from AGI.  Basically, taxable income is AGI less deductions (itemized 
or standard) and exemptions. 
16 Money Income in the United States, 1999, Table 12. G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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27% of their dividend income.  A typical high-income taxpayer, on the other hand, 
receives a significant amount of dividend income and is taxed on this income at a 
marginal rate of up to 38.6%. 
 
One can use the data from Table 2 to estimate the average tax savings for those in each 
AGI category.  Tax savings for each AGI category are estimated using the 2002 tax tables 
from the IRS.  As tax brackets differ by filing status, the analysis is not straightforward.  
Also, the appropriate marginal tax rate must be determined based on taxable income 
rather than AGI.  See Appendix 2 for the detailed assumptions made to derive the tax 
savings estimates.  The results, by AGI category, are presented in Table 3.
17 
 
Recall that 85% of all taxpayers had an AGI of less than $75,000 in 2000.  The benefits 
of the Bush proposal to repeal dividend taxation for these taxpayers average less than 
$100.  Of course, for a taxpayer who receives no dividend income (the majority of 
taxpayers), he or she receives no direct benefit from repealing dividend taxes.  For a 
typical taxpayer with an AGI of around $20,000 or $30,000, the average benefits of 
repealing dividend taxes amount to only about $40. 
 




Avg. Dividend Income 






in AGI (%) 
No AGI    $1,375  $0  0.0%  0.0% 
$1 under $5,000  88  9  0.3  0.3 
$5,000 under $10,000  149  15  0.5  0.2 
$10,000 under $15,000  220  22  0.6  0.2 
$15,000 under $20,000  274  38  1.1  0.2 
$20,000 under $25,000  249  34  0.8  0.2 
$25,000 under $30,000  313  47  0.9  0.2 
$30,000 under $40,000  398  60  1.9  0.2 
$40,000 under $50,000  604  124  3.1  0.3 
$50,000 under $75,000  853  157  6.4  0.3 
$75,000 under $100,000  1,462  396  8.1  0.5 
$100,000 under $200,000  3,324  911  17.6  0.7 
$200,000 under $500,000  10,848  3,797  19.4  1.3 
$500,000 under $1,000,000  28,943  11,172  10.6  1.6 
$1,000,000 under $1,500,000  51,882  20,026  4.8  1.7 
$1,500,000 under $2,000,000  78,266  30,211  3.2  1.8 
$2,000,000 under $5,000,000  120,901  46,668  7.4  1.6 
$5,000,000 under $10,000,000  266,578  102,899  4.3  1.5 
$10,000,000 or more  862,542  332,941  8.9  1.2 
TOTAL  $1,136  $323  100%  +0.7% 
                                                 
17 The benefit estimates in Table 3 are based on the quantity and distribution of dividend income in 2000.  
Of course, the quantity and distribution of dividend income could differ in the future.  Thus, the estimates 
should not be interpreted as projections of tax savings should dividend taxes be eliminated.  G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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In contrast, at the upper end of the income distribution significant savings are evident 
(see Table 3).  Taxpayers with an AGI of over $100,000 receive an average benefit of 
over $3,000.  Those with an AGI of $10 million or more receive an average benefit of 
over $300,000.  So, a typical taxpayer receives a very small benefit, if any, from the 
President’s proposal while very high-income payers receive huge benefits. 
 
The second-to-last column in Table 3 indicates the distribution of the tax savings from 
repealing the dividend tax.  Those taxpayers with an AGI of less than $50,000 (about 
72% of all taxpayers) would receive an aggregate share of only 9% of the benefits.  On 
the other hand, those with an AGI over $100,000 (just 8% of taxpayers) would receive 
slightly over 75% of the savings.  Even further, most of those benefits (nearly 40% of all 




VI. Impact on Economic Inequality 
 
Given that the wealthy receive the majority of dividend income, it is not surprising that 
they would receive most of the benefits.  This will be true with any across-the-board tax 
cut.  High-income filers pay most of the taxes in the U.S. and would receive most of the 
benefits of any general tax cut.  So, the fact that the benefits of repealing dividend 
taxation accrue predominately to the wealthy does not necessarily imply that repealing 
dividend taxation exacerbates economic inequality in the U.S.  To explore this issue, one 
needs to determine how the proposal affects the overall distribution of after-tax income. 
 
One way to conduct this analysis is to estimate the percentage change in income for 
different AGI levels.  For a policy to be neutral with respect to inequality levels, those in 
all income categories would see their income increase (or decrease) by the same 
proportion.  As seen in the last column of Table 3, that is not the case with the proposal to 
repeal dividend taxes.  Those with a low AGI see a minor increase in their average 
income – less than 0.5% (using a base of average AGI).  However, those with more than 
$200,000 in AGI see an income increase over 1.0%.  From these data, we can conclude 
that repealing dividend taxation will, ceteris paribus, increase income inequality in the 
U.S.  
 
Similar to Figure 1, we can plot the distribution of the benefits of repealing the dividend 
tax against the distribution of returns ordered by AGI.  Figure 2 shows the results, which 
again are highly-skewed towards those with high AGI’s.  The distribution of tax savings 
can again be calculated using a coefficient similar to a Gini ratio.  The results based on 
the data shown in Figure 2 produce a coefficient of 0.83.  So, the distribution of the 
benefits of repealing the dividend tax is more unevenly distributed than dividend income 
itself (coefficient of 0.70), and much more unevenly distributed than overall income in 
the United States (coefficient of 0.47).  Again, this demonstrates that repealing dividend 
taxes will further increase income inequality in the U.S.   
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This paper has examined the distributional benefits of the Bush administration’s proposal 
to permanently eliminate dividend taxation received by individuals.  The administration’s 
claim that seniors receive the majority of dividend income is not supported by the 
available data.  It appears that the administration overstates the proportion of dividend 
income that accrues to seniors by a factor of two.  Additionally, the implication that the 
primary beneficiaries of repealing dividend taxation are seniors who rely on dividend 
income to get by is misleading.  Most taxpayers receive no dividend income, particularly 
those who are non-white, and would not benefit from a repeal of dividend taxation.  
High-income taxpayers receive the majority of dividend income and would be the 
primary beneficiaries of dividend tax repeal. 
 
The distribution of the benefits of repealing dividend taxation is disproportional to the 
distribution of dividend income.  Thus, repealing dividend taxation would, ceteris 
paribus, increase income inequality in the U.S.  Currently, income inequality in the U.S. 
is at a historic high.
18  Also, the level of economic inequality in the U.S. exceeds that 
                                                 
18 The Changing Shape of the Nation’s Income Distribution, 1947-1998, U.S. Census Bureau report P60-
204, June 2000. G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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found in any other developed country.
19  In light of this reality, policies that decrease 
economic inequality appear much more necessary than policies that further increase 
inequality.  Further, any federal tax cut will necessitate a reduction in spending unless it 
is offset with tax increases in other areas.
20  The Bush tax cut proposal is not revenue 
neutral, as noted in the economists’ statement opposing the tax cut.  This leads to an 
important question that has not been addressed by the Bush administration – how will 
federal spending be reduced to compensate for the tax cut? 
 
While revenue reductions could be offset with increased borrowing in the short term, 
permanent tax cuts will eventually impose fiscal constraints on the federal government.  
Spending cuts could, of course, be prioritized in numerous ways.  However, a particular 
concern voiced by the Bush administration’s critics is that permanent tax cuts will 
threaten the long-term solvency of the Social Security program.  Currently, the largest 
share of federal outlays (about 36%) is allocated towards Social Security, Medicare, and 
other federal retirement programs.  While the Social Security trust fund is currently 
running a surplus, the aging of the U.S. population implies that the trust fund, without 
revision, is not a permanent solution to the problem of funding Social Security.  Large 
permanent tax cuts only increase the likelihood that, eventually, Social Security benefits 
will have to be cut as the trust fund is drawn down. 
 
Unlike the case with dividend income, Social Security is an important source of income 
to American seniors, particularly low-income seniors.  Nearly 40% of all income received 
by seniors comes from Social Security while less than 5% comes from dividends.
21  Any 
reduction in Social Security benefits, including increasing the eligibility age, is likely to 
have a disproportionate impact on low-income seniors. 
 
This leads to an ironic implication of the Bush tax cut.  The tax cut, because it is revenue 
reducing, poses an increased risk that Social Security and other federal retirement 
benefits will have to be scaled back in the future.  The President states that his tax cut 
provides needed tax relief to America’s seniors.  In the long run, it may be that low-
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19 World Development Indicators 2002, World Bank, Table 2.8, Available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/data/2_8wdi2002.pdf.  
20 A tax cut could, in theory, stimulate economic growth sufficiently such that federal revenues increase as 
incomes and profits rise.  This is the standard supply-side argument for tax cuts, used to support the Reagan 
cuts in the 1980s.  The historical result, however, was not rising revenues and surpluses, but rising deficits. 
21 Money Income in the United States, 1999, Table 12. G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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Appendix 1. Gini Coefficients 
 
The Gini coefficient is a common metric used by economists to measure the degree of 
inequality in the distribution of income or wealth.  To illustrate the steps necessary to 
calculate a Gini coefficient, consider its application to the distribution of income across 
households.  First, arrange all households from lowest income to highest.  Then add up 
the total income of all households.  Next, calculate the cumulative percentage of income 
belonging to each group of ordered households.  For example, in the U.S. the bottom 
20% of households received 3.5% of income in 2001.
22  The second quintile received 
8.8% of income, so the cumulative share of income to the bottom 40
 percentiles of 
households is 12.3%.  Plot this relationship as shown in Figure A1.  The curve shown in 
Figure 1 is referred to as a Lorenz curve. 
 
If income were equally distributed, the Lorenz curve would be the 45-degree line shown 
in Figure 1.  As income becomes more unevenly distributed, the Lorenz curve bows away 
from the straight line.  Thus, the larger area A in Figure 1, the greater the degree of 
inequality.  A Gini coefficient is calculated as: 
 
  Gini coefficient = Area A / (Area A + Area B) 
 
Note that a Gini coefficient must range between zero (perfect equality) and one (one 
individual or household receives everything).  While other measures are used to measure 
economic inequality, the Gini coefficient is the most widely used metric and has been 
estimated for most countries in the world.    
 
Figure A1. Lorenz Curve for the U.S. Distribution of Income 
 
 
                                                 
22 Money Income in the United States: 2001, U.S. Census Bureau report P60-218, September 2002. G-DAE Working Paper No. 03-01: “Read My Lips: More New Tax Cuts” 
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Appendix 2. Details of Calculations to Estimate Tax Savings by AGI Category 
 
For each AGI category shown in Table 3, the IRS presents data on average taxable 
income in 2000.  These data are presented in Table A1 below.  Given taxable income, 
one can compare this to an IRS tax rate table and determine the appropriate marginal tax 
rate.    Assuming this tax rate represents the rate of dividend taxation, it can simply be 
multiplied by average dividend income to estimate the savings of repealing dividend 
taxes.  However, the applicable marginal tax rate is contingent upon filing status.  Table 
A1 indicates the 2002 marginal tax rates for each taxable income amount for the statuses 
of single, married filing jointly, and married filing separately. 
 
The most recent data on the distribution of tax filing status by AGI is from the 1999 tax 
returns.
23  These data are presented in Table A1.  The maximum AGI category in 1999 
was $1 million or more.  The filing status distribution of $1 million or more from 1999 is 
assumed to apply to all 2000 AGI categories above $1 million.  Note that most filers with 
a low AGI are single while the vast majority of very high-income filers are married. 
 
To estimate the marginal rate applied to dividends for each AGI category, the 2002 
marginal tax rate is weighed by the distribution by filing status.  In cases where the 
marginal rate for an AGI category is constant across filing statuses, weighing is not 
necessary.  However, for AGI categories such as $40,000-to-$50,000, an estimated 
applicable rate is dependent upon the distribution of filers.  The estimated applicable rate, 
presented in the last column, is the tax rate assumed to apply to dividend income for each 
AGI category.  Multiplying this rate by the average amount of dividend income in each 
AGI category produces an estimate of the tax savings should dividend taxes on 
individuals be repealed.  
 
                                                 
23 “Individual Income Tax, All Returns, 1999: Adjusted Gross Income, Exemptions, Deductions, and Tax 
Items, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income and Marital Status,” Statistics of Income, 1999, Individual 
Income Tax Returns, October 2001, November 2001.  Downloadable Excel spreadsheet available at 




Table A1. Taxable Income and Filing Status, by AGI Category 
 
2002 Maximum Marginal 
Tax Rates 





























No AGI  $0  0%  0%  0%  49.0%  39.8%  11.2%  0.0% 
$1 under $5,000  $995  10%  10%  10%  85.4%  5.0%  9.6%  10.0% 
$5k under $10k  $2,181  10%  10%  10%  68.6%  10.4%  21.0%  10.0% 
$10k under $15k  $4,680  10%  10%  10%  56.4%  16.6%  27.0%  10.0% 
$15k under $20k  $7,154  15%  10%  15%  49.9%  23.5%  26.6%  13.8% 
$20k under $25k  $11,271  15%  10%  15%  48.3%  27.1%  24.7%  13.6% 
$25k under $30k  $15,499  15%  15%  15%  48.8%  30.1%  21.1%  15.0% 
$30k under $40k  $21,586  15%  15%  15%  42.1%  40.2%  17.7%  15.0% 
$40k under $50k  $29,412  27%  15%  27%  32.1%  54.6%  13.3%  20.4% 
$50k under $75k  $42,569  27%  15%  27%  21.0%  71.9%  7.1%  18.4% 
$75k under $100k  $62,626  27%  27%  30%  13.1%  83.0%  3.9%  27.1% 
$100k under $200k  $101,734  30%  27%  30%  11.2%  86.0%  2.8%  27.4% 
$200k under $500k  $244,699  35%  35%  35%  11.4%  85.6%  2.9%  35.0% 
$500k under $1m  $605,947  38.6%  38.6%  38.6%  12.4%  84.4%  3.2%  38.6% 
$1m under $1.5m  $1,092,724  38.6%  38.6%  38.6%  13.1%  83.0%  3.8%  38.6% 
$1.5m under $2m  $1,563,955  38.6%  38.6%  38.6%  13.1%  83.0%  3.8%  38.6% 
$2m under $5m  $2,720,958  38.6%  38.6%  38.6%  13.1%  83.0%  3.8%  38.6% 
$5m under $10m  $6,244,602  38.6%  38.6%  38.6%  13.1%  83.0%  3.8%  38.6% 
$10m or more  $24,010,714  38.6%  38.6%  38.6%  13.1%  83.0%  3.8%  38.6% 
 
                                                 
24 Data from “Individual Income Tax Returns, 2000” by David Campbell and Michael Parisi, IRS Statistics 
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